Abstract: Based on the goal of “double carbon”,the action of carbon reduction in petroleum energy is urgent.This paper established the replication dynamic equation of Sino-Russian oil and energy cooperation under carbon trading price with defining the various variables and parameters from the aspects of carbon trading price,comprehensive income,emission reduction cost,reputation loss,government rewards and punishments by taking Chinese petroleum enterprises,Russian petroleum enterprises and Chinese government as three main bodies.Then it adopted the dynamic game theory model to analyze the game evolution law of strategic behavior.Through the analysis,it’s concluded that:①Carbon trading market could promote the low-carbon development of oil and energy,and raising the price of carbon trading could enhance the willingness of China’s oil companies to actively reduce emissions.②When Russian enterprises chose to assist Chinese enterprises,the greater the reputational loss they bear,the more inclined Chinese enterprises were to choose active emission reduction strategies.③The intensity of government incentives and punishments was positively correlated with the possibility of Chinese oil companies to choose active emission reduction strategies.From the perspective of multi-party evolutionary game,this paper presented the optimal emission reduction strategy of Chinese enterprises under the strategic pull of the government and Russian enterprises,which providing theoretical support and decision-making basis for the carbon reduction action of the oil and energy industry.